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ABSTRACT 
The filibuster in the United States Senate effectively imposes a 
supermajority vote requirement to pass any legislation. Both supporters 
and critics of the filibuster agree that any filibuster reform would require 
extraordinary measures. In contrast to this consensus, this Article 
describes a method we call the “conventional option,” which allows the 
filibuster to be reformed by a simple majority of senators at any time using 
ordinary Senate procedures. As we show below, a majority of senators 
using the conventional option (1) cannot be filibustered; (2) can act on 
any day the Senate is in session (not just at the beginning of a new 
Congress); and (3) does not need to invoke the Constitution. In fact, this 
Article shows that both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate 
have limited filibustering in the past by using the conventional option 
described here. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) was fed up. Reid, the majority leader for 
the Democrats in the United States Senate,
1
 had hoped that the Senate 
would confirm three nominees to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.
2
 
However, the Republican minority was filibustering their confirmation.
3
 
Republican obstruction against these nominations was part of a broader 
strategy of forcing an unprecedented number of votes on whether the 
Senate should end filibusters using the Senate’s “cloture” rule.4 Since a 
three-fifths majority is necessary to invoke cloture, this increased use of 
the filibuster effectively imposes a supermajority vote requirement to 
approve nominations or pass most legislation in the Senate.
5
 In the past, 
 
 
 1. For the sake of brevity, we refer to the United States Senate as the “Senate” and the United 
States House of Representative as the “House of Representatives” or the “House.” 
 2. Press Release, U.S. Senate Democrats, Reid Remarks on Republican Obstruction of Judicial 
Nominees (Nov. 18, 2013, 3:51 PM), available at http://democrats.senate.gov/2013/11/18/reid-
remarks-on-republican-obstruction-of-judicial-nominees/. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on 
Nominees, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-
limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-
11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html (providing chart of increases in the use of filibuster to obstruct). 
 5. GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN THE HOUSE 
AND SENATE 1–14 (2010) [hereinafter FILIBUSTERING]. On the Senate cloture rule, see infra note 48 
and accompanying text. Proposals to change the rules of the Senate are subject to a cloture threshold of 
two-thirds of all senators voting. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/2
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Reid vowed to “change the rules and make the filibuster meaningful.”6 But 
Reid had refrained from implementing any reform apart from limited 
changes at the beginning of the 112th and 113th congressional terms.
7
 
On Thursday, November 21, 2013, however, Reid made good on his 
threat to change the rules by setting in motion what has become 
colloquially known as “the nuclear option.”8 By a vote of fifty-two to 
forty-eight, senators enacted a new precedent allowing a simple majority 
of the Senate to limit debate for all nominations except those to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
9
 The term “nuclear option” dates at least as far back as 
2005, when, ironically, then Senate Republican majority leader Bill Frist 
(R-TN) threatened to use “the nuclear option” to prevent the filibustering 
of President Bush's judicial nominees.
10
 The “nuclear option” then, as 
now, was based on a proposal made in a law review article written by 
Martin Gold and Dimple Gupta that argued that a simple majority in the 
Senate has a limited “constitutional option” to change the existing 
filibuster rules.
11
  
Terms like “nuclear” and “constitutional” reflect a consensus that any 
reform of the filibuster would require extraordinary and unprecedented 
measures. This consensus supports a conclusion shared by many that it 
would be “rude”12 for a majority of Senators to reform the filibuster 
because it would “change[] . . . the rules in the midst of a game.”13 Thus, 
Gold and Gupta emphasized that a majority of senators use the 
“constitutional option” at the beginning of a congressional term, when, 
arguably, a new Senate can jettison the old rules and impose new ones to 
 
 
 6. Suzy Khimm, Harry Reid Promises Filibuster Reform if Dems Win the Election, WASH. 
POST WONKBLOG (July 17, 2012, 10:40 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/ 
2012/07/17/harry-reid-promises-filibuster-reform-if-dems-win-the-election/; see also Sam Stein & 
Ryan Grim, Harry Reid: Filibuster Reform Will Be Pursued in the Next Congress, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Nov. 7, 2012, 1:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/07/harry-reid-filibuster-reform_ 
n_2088767.html. 
 7. For a discussion of the 2011 and 2013 reforms, see infra Part II.B.4. 
 8. Kane, supra note 4. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senators Who Averted Showdown Face New Test in Court Fight, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 14, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/14/politics/14gang.html?pagewanted=all. 
 11. Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to Change Senate Rules and 
Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Over Come the Filibuster, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205 
(2004). 
 12. See Ezra Klein, The Date for Filibuster Reform: Jan. 22. Probably., WASH. POST 
WONKBLOG (Jan. 3, 2013, 5:10 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/ 
03/the-date-for-filibuster-reform-january-22-probably/?wprss=rss_ezra-klein. 
 13. See Letter from Bruce A. Ackerman et al., to Members of the United States Senate (Dec. 12, 
2012), available at http://www.tomudall.senate.gov/files/documents/ScholarsLettertoSenate.pdf. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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govern the term.
14
 Others have tried to support changes to the filibuster by 
appealing to the Constitution's “implicit directive of simple majority 
rule.”15 Indeed, prior to Sen. Reid's use of the nuclear option, a lawsuit 
filed by the left-leaning public interest group Common Cause alleged that 
the modern Senate filibuster is unconstitutional because it is “inconsistent 
with the principle of majority rule” implied by various provisions of the 
Constitution.
16
  
In this Article, we argue against the consensus that filibuster reform by 
a majority of senators is (1) extraordinary, (2) unprecedented, and 
therefore (3) requires an appeal to Constitutional authority. Indeed, we 
take issue with the term “nuclear option” insofar as it has been defined as 
any option that allows a majority of senators to reform the filibuster 
without the consent of the minority. Instead, we show that filibuster 
reform by a majority of senators (1) only requires quite ordinary measures, 
(2) has been done extensively in the past, and, accordingly, (3) should not 
be viewed as improper or indecorous. Indeed, as we show below, the 
“nuclear option” as used by Sen. Reid can be understood as a 
“conventional option,” one that has been used throughout the history of 
the Senate and the House of Representatives. 
In Part I, we explain the ordinary procedures a majority of senators can 
use to reform the filibuster at any time. These procedures, which we call 
the conventional option, utilize the rules and procedures that govern rule 
interpretation in the Senate. As we show below, the conventional option is 
conventional in the sense that it only relies upon the ordinary rules and 
precedents of the Senate.
17
 It does not require the cooperation of a 
supermajority of Senators. It does not require Senators to wait for the 
beginning of a new Congress. It does not require an appeal to the 
Constitution.  
 
 
 14. Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 217–60 (discussing this option first and at length, as 
opposed to the conventional option discussed here). 
 15. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 362–63 (2012); see also Akhil Reed Amar & Gary Hart, How to End the 
Filibuster Forever, SLATE (Jan. 6, 2011, 2:11 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politicsj 
urisprudence/2011/01/how_to_end_the_filibuster_forever.html. 
 16. Complaint for a Declaratory Judgment at 3, Common Cause v. Biden, No. 1:12-cv-00775, 
2014 WL 1420327 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2014); see also Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the 
Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1035–37 (2011) (making similar arguments concerning the 
unconstitutionality of the Senate filibuster, but noting that judicial review of the issue “would be a 
non-starter”). 
 17. Conventional, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/conventional (last visited Sept. 11, 2013) (defining “conventional” as, among other things, 
“common and ordinary: not unusual”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/2
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We further show that the conventional option is quite versatile and can 
be used to enact a number of reforms. We provide five such potential 
reforms that a majority of senators could enact through the conventional 
option.
18
 Indeed, we show that the process used by Sen. Reid to abolish the 
filibuster for judicial nominees is far from optimal and that better 
alternatives are available.
19
 
In Part II, we further demonstrate that the conventional option is 
“conventional” in another important sense. The rhetoric surrounding the 
“nuclear option” suggests that any reform of the filibuster by a Senate 
majority would be unprecedented, or at least a significant departure from 
the historic practices and procedures of the Senate. But, as we discuss in 
Part II, the procedures that comprise the conventional option have been 
used throughout the history of the House and Senate to limit filibustering. 
Indeed, it has been the most common, conventional method of reforming 
the filibuster.
20
 As we discuss below, the House of Representatives, in 
fact, abolished the filibuster using the conventional option we discuss in 
this Article.
21
  
Our goal in writing this Article is not to criticize or defend the 
filibuster. Instead, our goal is to show that the recent actions of the 
Democratic majority to abolish the filibuster for judicial nominees should 
not be seen as unprecedented, extraordinary, or unseemly. That view is not 
only incorrect, but it presumes that the filibuster itself is a normal 
procedure that senators are, for the most part, powerless to change. 
However, as we show below, the filibuster is not, nor has to be, an 
inviolable part of the Senate. More importantly, the existence of the 
conventional option demonstrates that the key obstacle to filibuster reform 
is not the Senate rules, but the reluctance of a majority of senators to enact 
it. Accordingly, we hope that by showing how simple it is for a majority to 
change the filibuster at any time, public debate will focus squarely on 
whether filibustering as currently practiced in the Senate advances or 
harms the public interest. Paradoxically, senators may be more likely to 
arrive at bipartisan compromises on Senate process once they fully 
acknowledge the extent of the Senate majority to reshape the rules of the 
Senate without minority party consent.  
 
 
 18. See infra Part I.B. 
 19. See infra Parts I.B.4 & I.C. 
 20. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, supra note 17 (defining “conventional” as “used 
and accepted by most people: usual or traditional”). 
 21. See infra Part II.A. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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I. THE CONVENTIONAL OPTION 
This Part provides a guide for reforming the modern filibuster in the 
Senate, which we call the conventional option. Our guide shows how the 
conventional option allows a simple majority of senators to reform the 
filibuster any day the Senate is in session without having to appeal to 
constitutional authority. As shown below, the conventional option we 
describe utilizes commonly used procedures of rule interpretation in the 
Senate. 
A. The Rules of the Senate Filibuster  
1. Filibustering in the Senate 
For the sake of clarity, we define filibustering in a legislature as the 
threat or use of delay to obstruct an event for strategic gain.
22
 Understood 
in this broad sense, a legislator can filibuster by making dilatory motions, 
by proposing meaningless amendments, by refusing to vote en masse, or 
by making long speeches.
23
 As defined, filibustering is not unique to the 
Senate. It has occurred in dozens of state and international legislatures. In 
fact, and as we discuss later in this Article, filibustering was once 
pervasive in the House of Representatives.
24
 
The traditional response to filibustering is a war of attrition. In these 
contests, the majority forces the obstructionists to remain on the floor of 
the chamber and actively consume time. The winner is the side that lasts 
the longest, but both sides lose time and sleep in the process. 
A second response is cloture, where the majority attempts to limit the 
duration of floor debate using a motion provided for in the rules of the 
legislature. Under Rule XXII of the Senate rules, a senator can move for 
cloture, but any such motion requires sixty votes to end debate,
25
 with 
some exceptions.
26
 In the modern Senate, almost all filibusters consist of 
 
 
 22. FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 3 (citing AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000)).  
 23. Id. at 3–4 (discussing examples).  
 24. See infra Part II.A.  
 25. SENATE RULE XXII, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, 
AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 112-1, at 
21 (2011), available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RulesOfSenateHome. 
“Closure” is also sometimes used to refer to the general idea of a rule to limit debate. See id. (“‘Is it the 
sense of the Senate that the debate shall be brought to a close?’ And if that question shall be decided in 
the affirmative by three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn . . . .”).  
 26. There are specific classes of legislation—most notably budget resolutions and budget 
reconciliation bills—that cannot be filibustered because there are statutory limits on how long they can 
be debated on the Senate floor. See id. at 21–22. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/2
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threats to filibuster. Senators rarely occupy the floor of the Senate for an 
active filibuster, and instead place the burden on the majority to 
successfully move for cloture.
27
 
A third response is to revise the rules and practice of the legislature. 
Simply put, filibustering is usually the weapon of a minority in legislatures 
with endogenous rules. Accordingly, a frustrated majority may reduce or 
eliminate the ability of a minority to obstruct. 
However, frustrated majorities in the Senate face a Catch-22. If the 
Senate rules and practice allow obstruction through the filibuster, then any 
proposal to restrict filibustering may itself be filibustered. The Senate’s 
cloture rule imposes a higher threshold in such cases: a motion for cloture 
to end debate on a formal amendment to the Senate rules requires a two-
thirds majority, which is greater than the threshold to end an ordinary 
filibuster against a bill or nomination and seemingly prevents a narrow 
majority from limiting the Senate filibuster.
28
 
2. The Senate Rules 
To unravel this Gordian knot, a more detailed discussion of the Senate 
rules that allow for filibustering is required. The Constitution provides that 
“[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”29 But no 
provision of the Constitution, or parliamentary rule in the Senate or the 
House, guarantees an explicit right to filibuster. 
The Constitution does, however, contain a provision for a roll call vote 
upon the request of one-fifth of those present,
30
 which allows for 
obstruction by dilatory motions. The Constitution also includes a simple 
majority quorum requirement for both houses,
31
 which allows for 
obstruction by quorum-breaking. The Framers were well aware that these 
provisions would provide a basis for obstruction. For example, James 
Mason, one of the original framers, expressed support for quorum-
breaking in the Virginia legislature to thwart a “paper money” bill.32  
 
 
 27. See FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 179–83. 
 28. See id. at 20–21; SENATE RULE XXII, SENATE MANUAL, at 21 (The three-fifths vote 
requirement applies “except on a measure or motion to amend the Senate rules, in which case the 
necessary affirmative vote shall be two-thirds of the Senators present and voting”). 
 29. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 30. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (“Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to 
time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas 
and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those 
Present, be entered on the Journal.”).  
 31. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“[A] Majority of each [house] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business”). 
 32. Madison Debates, Tuesday, August 10, 1787, THE AVALON PROJECT: DOCUMENTS IN LAW, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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That is not to say that the Framers unequivocally endorsed filibustering 
or minority vetoes. Indeed, in The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton 
condemned minority obstruction and supermajority thresholds, particularly 
those contained in the Articles of Confederation.
33
 Instead, we only 
suggest that the Framers were familiar with the practice of obstruction and 
held mixed views on the practice. In this sense, they were much like 
contemporary critics and defenders of the Senate filibuster, except their 
arguments were presumably free from appeals to the true intent of the 
Founding Fathers. 
In accordance with Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, the Senate 
has adopted forty-three formal rules to govern its proceedings, including 
Rule XXII, which is mentioned above.
34
 It has long been common practice 
to treat these rules as continuing in force from one Congress to the next 
without formal re-adoption.
35
 This practice is now codified in Senate Rule 
V, which provides that “[t]he rules of the Senate shall continue from one 
Congress to the next Congress unless they are changed as provided in 
these rules.”36 Of course, Rule V is only binding if the Senate is a 
“continuous body,”37 which is itself a parliamentary question that senators 
can revisit at the beginning of each new Congress.
38
  
In their article, Gold and Gupta argue in favor of a “constitutional 
option” to reform the filibuster, which would overturn this tradition and, 
instead, require the Senate to begin each new Congress in a state of 
 
 
HISTORY & DIPLOMACY, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_810.asp (last visited Dec. 
17, 2012). 
 33. E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that supermajority requirements 
like the ones found in the Articles of Confederation “substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an 
insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt [faction for] the regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable 
majority”); id. NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting “that all provisions which require more than the 
majority of any body to its resolutions, have a direct tendency to embarrass the operations of the 
government, and an indirect one to subject the sense of the majority to that of the minority”). 
 34. See SENATE RULE XXII, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, 
LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 
112-1, at 21 (2011), available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RulesOfSenate 
Home. 
 35. Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 240–47 (noting this understanding prior to passage of Senate 
Rule V in 1963).  
 36. See SENATE RULE V, SENATE MANUAL, at 5. 
 37. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 445, 464 
(2004) (noting that “the Senate has always viewed itself as a continuing body and has never 
reconstructed itself, like the House of Representatives, from scratch at the outset of every session”). 
Support for the “continuing body” theory of the Senate can also be found in McGrain v. Daugherty, 
where the Court held that subpoenas issued by a Senate committee were not moot after the end of a 
Congress because the Senate is “a continuing body.” 273 U.S. 135, 181 (1927). We note that our 
argument does not depend on whether the Senate is a continuing body one way or the other.  
 38. Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 207–10.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/2
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parliamentary anarchy until new rules are formally adopted.
39
 We discuss 
the constitutional option in greater detail in the next section.
40
 However, 
we note that a second way to reform the filibuster, one acknowledged but 
deemphasized by Gold and Gupta, is to raise and win a parliamentary 
point of order reinterpreting an existing Senate rule or clarifying an 
ambiguity in the rules.
41
 We argue that this conventional option—and not 
an appeal to constitutional authority—is the secret to filibuster reform by a 
simple majority. And, critically, the conventional option, unlike the 
constitutional option, can be utilized at any time during a two-year 
Congressional term. 
3. Senate Rule Interpretation 
Like statutes or the Constitution, the rules of the Senate are subject to 
interpretation. But unlike these other legal sources, the Senate rules are 
enforced and interpreted by the senators themselves rather than a court. 
During Senate deliberation, any senator can submit a point of order to the 
Presiding Officer of the Senate challenging the enforcement or 
interpretation of a rule.
42
 Although the Constitution defines the Presiding 
Officer as the Vice-President,
43
 in practice the Senate elects a President 
pro tempore to serve as the Presiding Officer in the Vice-President's 
absence.
44
 The President pro tempore, in turn, often delegates the task of 
presiding over the chamber to other members of the majority party. 
Once a point of order is submitted, the Presiding Officer either sustains 
or denies it, unless it raises a constitutional question.
45
 A senator has the 
 
 
 39. Id. at 217.  
 40. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 41. Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 260–61.  
 42. SENATE RULE XX, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, 
AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 112-1, at 
21 (2011), available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RulesOfSenateHome 
(providing that “[a] question of order may be raised at any stage of the proceedings”). 
 43. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (“The Vice President of the United States shall be President of 
the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.”). 
 44. Id. art. 1, § 3, cl. 5 (“The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro 
tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the 
United States.”). 
 45. SENATE RULE XX, SENATE MANUAL, at 19–20 (“A question of order . . . , unless submitted 
to the Senate, shall be decided by the Presiding Officer without debate, subject to an appeal to the 
Senate.”). Although the text of RULE XX does not create an exception for constitutional issues, 
previous Presiding Officers have treated points of order concerning constitutional issues this way. See 
Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 249 (noting that in 1963 then Vice President Johnson referred a point 
of order to the full Senate because “the motion raised an issue of constitutional interpretation”); see 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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right to appeal any decision by the Presiding Officer.
46
 Appeals are 
decided by a simple majority vote of those senators present.
47
  
However, appeals are typically debatable,
48
 and it is unclear if such 
debate can be limited. One option is for a senator to make a non-debatable 
motion to table an appeal. Any decision upheld or overturned by a direct 
vote or a tabling motion is considered precedent having the same force 
and effect as a formal rule.
49
 Second, a Presiding Officer might, of his or 
her own accord, intervene in debate on an appeal and declare that 
sufficient discussion has occurred. A third tactic would be to raise a 
second point of order that debate is not permitted on an appeal from the 
ruling of the Presiding Officer. This secondary point of order is guaranteed 
an immediate vote by Senate Rule XX:  
When an appeal is taken, any subsequent question of order which 
may arise before the decision of such appeal shall be decided by the 
Presiding Officer without debate; and every appeal therefrom shall 
be decided at once, and without debate.
50
  
By invoking this rule, a majority can use a second point of order to 
circumvent a filibuster on the primary point of order. 
B. How to Use the Conventional Option 
The general ability of senators to interpret the rules of the Senate at any 
time has not gained much attention in the legal debate over filibuster 
reform. In this Section, we show how much discretion senators enjoy over 
the meaning of their rules and the right to filibuster by sketching out five 
strategies to reform the filibuster using the procedures for Senate rule 
interpretation. We refer to this specific method for reforming the filibuster 
through Senate rule interpretation as the “conventional option,” because 
this method utilizes the conventional, ordinary rules of the Senate, and 
nothing else.  
 
 
also SENATE RULE XX, SENATE MANUAL, at 20 (“The Presiding Officer may submit any question of 
order for the decision of the Senate.”). 
 46. Id. at 19 (providing that any question of order is “subject to an appeal to the Senate”). 
 47. FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS AND 
PRACTICES, S. Doc. 101-28, at 145–49 (Alan S. Frumin, ed., rev. ed. 1992). 
 48. Id.; see also Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 260 (noting that “debate may generally be had 
on appeals.”).  
 49. SENATE RULE XX, SENATE MANUAL, at 20 (“[A]ny appeal may be laid on the table without 
prejudice to the pending proposition, and thereupon shall be held as affirming the decision of the 
Presiding Officer.”). 
 50. Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
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Because all five strategies we outline utilize the conventional option, 
we begin with Figure 1, which provides a stylized example of how the 
conventional option would be used to reform the filibuster. For the sake of 
clarity, Figure 1 assumes two teams, Pro and Con, who respectively 
support and oppose reform, and who make the next parliamentary move at 
each stage instead of surrendering. Figure 1 also omits any other 
extraneous motions that may arise. 
FIGURE 1—SEQUENCE OF MOVES IN RULING ON POINTS OF ORDER 
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It is worth highlighting that a strategy which uses the conventional 
option illustrated by Figure 1 only requires a majority of senators present 
who favor the strategy to ensure its passage. Indeed, because, under the 
Constitution, the Senate only requires “a majority” of senators to establish 
a quorum, filibuster reform through the conventional option could be 
enacted with as few as twenty-six senators.
51
  
Figure 1 demonstrates that the easiest way to use the conventional 
option to enact filibuster reform is to have a Presiding Officer who will 
decide in favor of the reform strategy. As shown on the left side of Figure 
1, once the Presiding Officer has ruled in favor of the reform strategy 
contained in the initial point of order, a simple majority can table any 
appeal of that ruling. By tabling the appeal, a majority effectively enacts 
the Presiding Officer's favorable ruling as binding precedent.  
But Figure 1 also shows that a pro-reform majority is not dependent on 
a favorable ruling from the Presiding Officer to reform the filibuster. As 
shown on the right side of Figure 1, if the Presiding Officer rules against 
Pro's first point of order, and if Con filibusters Pro's appeal of the denial, 
then Pro can raise a second point of order (or “secondary appeal”) that 
debate on the Presiding Officer's ruling is not permitted (or subject to 
some specified limit). Again, a second point of order is not subject to 
debate, and thus cannot be filibustered.
52
 Accordingly, once the second 
point of order is passed, then a vote on the first point of order immediately 
occurs (or occurs after a specified time), which itself only requires a 
simple majority of those senators present to vote in its favor to pass.  
While, in our view, each of the five strategies we discuss is possible, 
our primary goal is only to illustrate the power of a majority to change the 
Senate rules. In order to refute our thesis that a majority of senators can 
reform the filibuster at any time, one would have to prove that none of 
these strategies are possible, and that no other strategy employing 
parliamentary points of order is possible as well. In providing these five 
strategies, we posit four criteria for any reform strategy: 
Magnitude: We are agnostic on the desirability of reforming the 
filibuster, but we assume that any coalition implementing one of 
 
 
 51. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (providing that “a Majority of each [House] shall constitute a 
Quorum to do Business”).  
 52. SENATE RULE XX, SENATE MANUAL. Richard Beth, an expert at the Congressional Research 
Service, notes that “any course of action through which this suggestion might be implemented might 
be too complex for practical feasibility.” RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42929, 
PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERING CHANGES IN SENATE RULES 13 (2013). As noted in Part II.A.1, the 
members of the U.S. House found this approach practical and feasible in 1811. 
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these strategies will consider whether the reform would constitute a 
major change in the practice of the Senate. 
Practicality: Reforms may have unintended, but foreseeable, 
consequences once they have been adopted. It is worthwhile to 
consider how strategic politicians will react to a reform after it is 
enacted. In practice, a “major” reform may be completely 
unworkable. 
Plausibility: We do not consider it necessary or sufficient for a 
successful parliamentary interpretation to be objectively “right” or 
“wrong.” However, the stronger the logic of the pro-reform 
argument, the easier it will be to explain to the media and gain the 
approval of the general public. 
Simplicity: We take the view that determined majorities can 
accomplish major changes, but some strategies are preferable 
because they require fewer steps than others, and thus may take less 
time with less risk of failure.  
The first two criteria capture different dimensions of how the reform will 
change the daily practice of the Senate.
53
 The last two criteria measure (at 
least in part) the transaction costs reformers must pay to impose these 
changes. We assume these costs are lower for plausible reforms that 
require fewer steps to implement.  
In discussing each strategy below, we note factors that limit the 
strategy's magnitude, practical effect, plausibility, and simplicity of 
implementation.  
1. Repeal the Traditional Notion that the Senate Is a Continuing Body 
Although this may be the most complicated of the strategies, it has also 
been the most attempted.
54
 First, a majority must overturn a precedent that 
the Senate is a “standing body”—that the Senate rules automatically 
 
 
 53. The effect of a reform on policy choices also depends on factors exogenous to the strategy 
selected, such as the party, preferences, and agendas of other key actors. In particular, the effect of 
reform on executive and judicial nominations will tend to be more significant when the Senate 
majority party is the same party as the President and more significant on legislative proposals when the 
Senate, House of Representatives, and Presidency are controlled by the same party. 
 54. See Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 217–40 (discussing examples); JULIAN E. ZELIZER, ON 
CAPITOL HILL: THE STRUGGLE TO REFORM CONGRESS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 1948–2000 (2004) 
(same); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the “Continuing Body” Theory of the Senate, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 1401 (2010). 
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continue from Congress to Congress.
55
 Next, the Senate, like the House, 
would consider amendments to its rules by simple majority vote. While a 
minority might still try to obstruct, this strategy gives pro-reform senators 
significant advantages by removing the old Senate rules as a fallback.  
This was the primary strategy of cloture reformers from 1953 to 1975. 
In 1963, 1967, 1969, 1971, and 1975, senators voted (directly or 
indirectly) on whether the Senate is a standing body.
56
 It was not until 
1975 that a majority of the Senate was willing to take the first step in this 
reform strategy. In 1975, a 51–42 majority initially supported repeal of the 
Senate's standing body precedent, but Senate reformers negotiated a 
modification in the cloture rule rather than force a simple majority vote on 
Senate rules.
57
 While senators failed to fully execute their strategy, it 
nonetheless led to cloture reform and could have provided an open debate 
on the Senate's rules. 
Two advantages of this approach are that (1) it is based on a plausible 
argument and that, (2) if fully implemented, it can lead to any type of 
reform in the form of new, formal rule changes. In fact, once the Senate 
has committed to the notion that it must debate and re-adopt its rules every 
two years, there will be a regular opportunity for a simple majority to 
adopt future rule changes.  
The main disadvantage of this approach—and a major reason senators 
have never embraced it—is that it is extremely difficult to implement. The 
initial precedent repealing the Senate's standing body status is merely the 
first step in a long debate over the rules of the Senate. While senators who 
vote to repudiate the “standing body” tradition may do so to achieve 
filibuster reform, they also open the door to any and all proposals to revise 
Senate rules. Other senators may demand votes on proposals to change the 
Senate's committee system, the ethics code, the agenda-setting system, and 
so on.
58
  
Furthermore, this potentially long and complex debate over the rules of 
the Senate would occur without any formal rules in place to regulate the 
 
 
 55. In 1959, senators amended Rule V to state, “The rules of the Senate shall continue from one 
Congress to the next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules.” Gold & Gupta, 
supra note 11, at 240. This action changed nothing. The Senate can always decide that its rules 
(including Rule V) do not continue from Congress to Congress, in which case this provision would 
cease to be a constraint.  
 56. See Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 217–40. 
 57. SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? FILIBUSTERING IN THE 
UNITED STATES SENATE 181–82 (1997). 
 58. Senator Richard Russell (D-GA) threatened this response in 1957. See ROBERT A. CARO, 
MASTER OF THE SENATE: THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON 857 (2002).  
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debate. Instead, the Senate would operate under “general parliamentary 
law,”59 which is as vague as it sounds. Senators could appeal to the 
Constitution, Thomas Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice, the 
rules of the House of Representatives and state and foreign legislatures, 
and Robert's Rules of Order as authorities on general practice.
60
 As 
occurred in 1975, this would create ample opportunities for points of order 
and votes on parliamentary disputes.  
The prospect of this enormous debate, unguided by any set of rules, 
with high uncertainty about the outcomes, makes this option both costly 
and risky for senators who might otherwise support filibuster reform. In 
particular, it is not clear (1) whether any filibuster reform will emerge 
from the process, (2) what other reforms might be adopted, and (3) what 
reforms will be adopted in subsequent rule debates at the start of each 
Congress now that these debates are mandatory. Consequently, this 
strategy makes it especially difficult for pro-reform senators to build a 
simple majority coalition for their effort.
61
 
2. Introduce a Previous Question Motion 
Since 1811, the House of Representatives has used its “previous 
question” motion to limit debate—or to attempt to do so. As discussed in 
Part II.A, the meaning of the term “previous question” has evolved greatly 
since 1789, but in the modern U.S. House this motion, if approved, has the 
effect of terminating debate. Some scholars attribute the persistence of 
obstruction in the Senate to the fact that the formal rules of the Senate do 
not explicitly provide for a previous question motion.
62
 As we argue in 
Part II, this view drastically overstates the importance and effectiveness of 
the previous question motion.
63
 Nonetheless, if a simple majority of the 
Senate wants to introduce a previous question motion to the Senate, it 
would be simple to do so.  
This strategy starts with the recognition that while the rules of the 
Senate may not expressly provide for a previous question motion, they 
 
 
 59. See FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 54. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See Alexander Bolton, Dems short on votes for filibuster reform, THE HILL (Nov. 13, 2012, 
10:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/267471-dems-short-on-votes-for-filibuster-reform 
(noting that many Democratic supporters of filibuster reform are otherwise nervous about 
constitutional option). 
 62. SARAH A. BINDER, MINORITY RIGHTS, MAJORITY RULE: PARTISANSHIP AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF CONGRESS (1997).  
 63. See infra Part II.A (discussing the House previous question motion and its effect on 
filibustering in the House). 
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also do not expressly forbid the use of a previous question motion. Surely, 
a reformer might argue, senators should be free to use a motion that is 
generally used in American parliamentary practice if it will make the 
Senate a more effective legislature. Thus, any senator may move the 
previous question on any bill, nomination, or motion on the Senate floor. 
This would doubtless set in motion a cycle of parliamentary objection, a 
ruling from the Presiding Officer, and angling for a decisive vote.  
A crucial distinction between this strategy and the “continuing body” 
approach, however, is that a winning vote on a parliamentary ruling is also 
substantively decisive. Once the reform coalition wins the vote on the 
appeal from the chair, senators will be able to move the previous question. 
Thus, this is a high-impact reform that is simple to implement. And, 
importantly, reformers can take this action at any point within a two-year 
Congress, and not just at the very beginning. 
In the past, senators have considered this strategy plausible enough to 
attempt it. In February 1915, Ollie James (D-KY) suggested during Senate 
debate that any member could move the previous question on the bill.
64
 
Once the chair ruled this motion out of order, any member could appeal 
the ruling and bring about a simple majority vote on adding a previous 
question motion to Senate procedure. James promised to force a vote on 
his ruling if he was the Presiding Officer.
65
 Democrats seriously 
considered the strategy but did not have the majority needed to win the 
procedural question.
66
  
The main drawback of this strategy is that the previous question motion 
may not be a practical response to filibustering. As we discuss in the next 
section, the House of Representatives struggled to use the previous 
question motion as a constraint on excessive debate without limiting all 
fair debate and amending activity on the chamber floor.
67
 Furthermore, the 
previous question motion was vulnerable to obstruction by dilatory 
motions and disappearing quorums, limiting its effectiveness as a cloture 
mechanism.
68
  
 
 
 64. 52 CONG. REC. 3738 (1915) (statement of Sen. James). 
 65. Id. 
 66. FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE, FILIBUSTERING IN THE SENATE 112–13 (1940). 
 67. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 68. BURDETTE, supra note 66, at 112–31; see also BINDER, supra note 62, at 92–129. 
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3. Transform the Motion to Suspend the Rules 
Senate Rule V allows motions to suspend the rules—that is, to ignore 
any rule or practice—provided that senators file the motion one day before 
they bring it up in the Senate.
69
 These motions can include all the detail of 
an agenda-setting “special rule” in the House—calling up a bill, laying out 
the terms of debate and amendment, and then a specific time for a final 
passage vote.
70
 In that sense, they are very flexible tools for preventing 
obstruction. Unlike the comparable House rule, Senate Rule V does not 
specify a threshold for suspending the rules, so the default interpretation 
would normally be that a simple majority is required.
71
  
However, in 1915 and 1916, the Senate enacted precedents that a two-
thirds majority is required to suspend the rules.
72
 These precedents 
demonstrate the ability of a simple majority of the Senate to alter the 
practical meaning of standing rules by using the conventional option. The 
imposition of a two-thirds threshold was contrary to the previous, if rare, 
standard for this motion in the Senate and the general norm of 
parliamentary construction: unless specified otherwise, all decisions are 
based on simple majority rule.
73
 The best parliamentary justification that 
senators could muster for the two-thirds threshold was that the House of 
Representatives requires a two-thirds majority to suspend its rules, but this 
is only because the rules of the House have specified this threshold since 
1822.
74
  
Two new precedents would be required to convert the motion to 
suspend the rules into a flexible source of majority power in the Senate. 
First, a new precedent is required to ensure that a motion to suspend the 
 
 
 69. SENATE RULE V, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, 
AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 112-1, at 5 
(2011), available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RulesOfSenateHome (“No 
motion to suspend, modify, or amend any rule, or any part thereof, shall be in order, except on one 
day’s notice in writing, specifying precisely the rule or part proposed to be suspended, modified, or 
amended, and the purpose thereof.”). 
 70. See RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 93-854 GOV, THE MOTION TO PROCEED TO 
CONSIDER A MEASURE IN THE SENATE, 1979–1992 (1993). 
 71. RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 47, at 1415 (“The Senate can control almost anything by a 
majority vote unless a limitation is found in the rules.”). 
 72. Gregory Koger, Filibuster Reform in the Senate, 1913–17, in 2 PARTY, PROCESS, AND 
POLITICAL CHANGE IN CONGRESS: FURTHER NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS 205 
(David W. Brady & Matthew D. McCubbins eds., 2007); see also RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 47, 
at 1271–72. 
 73. See AMAR, supra note 15, at 363–69 (citing a number of sources demonstrating that majority 
rule is the default rule); see also Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 
DUKE L.J. 73 (1996) (same). 
 74. Koger, supra note 72, at 214; see also BINDER, supra note 62, at 89–92. 
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rules is nondebatable.
75
 In Senate parlance, a motion or question that is 
“debatable” is subject to a filibuster, so the ability to “debate” motions to 
suspend the rules limits their use to prevent filibustering. The rationale for 
such a precedent is simple. If this motion is debatable or otherwise 
vulnerable to filibustering, its function is nullified because the purpose of 
suspending the rules is to circumvent any rule or practice that thwarts the 
intent of a majority (or supermajority) of the chamber. To fulfill its 
purpose, the motion to suspend the rules should be nondebatable. By itself, 
this precedent would provide the Senate with a new procedural tool 
against filibusters by single senators or very small coalitions. Instead of 
using the standard cloture process, which takes time to attempt and allows 
obstructionists to demand and use hours of post-cloture floor time, a large 
coalition of senators could suspend the rules by a two-thirds vote to 
quickly end a filibuster by a small coalition.  
If the majority of the Senate wishes to proceed further and institute 
simple majority rule in the Senate, then this is even easier to achieve. After 
a motion to suspend the rules receives the support of a majority of the 
Senate, but less than a two-thirds supermajority, the Presiding Officer will 
declare the motion failed in accordance with the 1915 and 1916 precedents 
mentioned above. At that moment, any senator can raise a point of order 
that a simple majority is sufficient to suspend the rules and, backed by a 
majority, overturn the precedents. 
This reform scores very well on our criteria. First, it has a high impact 
because motions to suspend the rules can be used to completely inoculate 
proposals against obstruction and ensure timely consideration of 
legislation supported by a Senate majority.  
Second, it is practical. Like special rules in the House, the content of 
the motions can be adapted to a wide range of situations as long as the 
motion is filed a day ahead of time. But unlike special rules in the House, 
the motions would, in practice, probably come directly from the leader of 
the majority party rather than a standing committee.
76
  
Third, it is perfectly plausible. This strategy restores the most logical 
interpretation of Rule V. It is nonsensical that a motion to suspend the 
rules can be filibustered, and the current two-thirds supermajority to 
 
 
 75. RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 47, at 785 (noting that a motion to suspend the rules is 
debatable). 
 76. Any senator can draft and introduce a motion to suspend the rules, but the majority leader 
enjoys priority in recognition, so the Presiding Officer will always call on him or her first. 
Consequently, no other senator could call up a motion to suspend the rules without at least the tacit 
consent of the majority party leader. See RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 47, at 1093.  
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suspend the rules was concocted out of thin air in defiance of the ordinary 
interpretation of Rule V.
77
 Last but not least, the strategy is simple to 
implement. It requires two decisive precedents that can be adopted 
separately.
78
 
4. Convert Rule XXII Into a Simple Majority Motion 
This option is audacious but effective, as demonstrated by the Senate 
Democrats’ use of this tactic in November 2013. As prescribed by Senate 
Rule XXII, a pro-reform coalition files a cloture petition on a measure and 
the Senate votes at noon after a two-day wait. If the number of votes for 
cloture is over fifty but under sixty, when the Presiding Officer states that 
the cloture attempt has failed, a reformer then raises a point of order that a 
simple majority is required to invoke cloture. This objection may be 
specific to a particular class of legislation, such as appropriations bills or 
executive nominations, or it may be generally applied. In November 2013, 
for example, Reid’s objection stated that the appropriate threshold for 
cloture on all nominations except the Supreme Court should be simple 
majority. Reid also retained the sixty-vote threshold for legislation and 
Supreme Court nominations.
79
  
The benefit of this approach is that it quickly institutes simple majority 
cloture in the Senate without the nearly impossible task of building a 
 
 
 77. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 91 (New York, Clark & 
Maynard 1871) (“The voice of the majority decides. For the lex majoris partis is the law of all 
councils, elections, &c., where not otherwise expressly provided.”). 
 78. Arguably there is constitutional support for this strategy. Akhil Amar argues that the 
Constitution implicitly establishes majority rule as a default. AMAR, supra note 15, at 363–69. 
Although not specified in the text of the Constitution, the fact that the Constitution only specifies non-
majority rule voting rules arguably supports an inference that a majority rule is the default rule. Id. at 
363; see, e.g., U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (providing that, after a veto, “[i]f after such 
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the 
Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two 
thirds of that House, it shall become a Law”). In fact, the Court has noted that “the general rule of all 
parliamentary bodies is that, when a quorum is present, the act of a majority of the quorum is the act of 
the body.” United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1892). Thus, although reinterpreting the motion to 
suspend the rules into a majoritarian motion rule would leave the existing cloture rules in place, it 
would at least provide a majoritarian means of avoiding a Senate filibuster, which would be consistent 
with the default of majority rule. Cf. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Rights of 
Legislators and the Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further Defense of the Constitutionality of Legislative 
Supermajority Rules, 47 DUKE L.J. 327 (1997) (arguing that supermajority rules are constitutional as 
long as there is a majoritarian right to suspend supermajority requirements at any time). Although we 
acknowledge this argument, we do not address its validity. In our view, such constitutional arguments 
are not necessary because the conventional option is sufficient to allow a majority of senators to 
implement this strategy. 
 79. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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supermajority coalition to pass a formal rules change. On the other hand, 
this reform leaves in place—at least for the time being—the delays built 
into the cloture process, such as waiting periods between filing and voting 
and an entitlement to post-cloture debate. These delays will still provide 
individual senators with great power to slow the progress of individual 
measures, or to delay the overall Senate agenda by forcing the chamber to 
go through the slow cloture process on any measure blocked by a single 
senator.  
Another benefit of this strategy is that there is a convenient path to a 
decisive vote. Once debate begins on the reformers’ initial point of order, a 
reformer can raise a second point of order invoking the terms of Rule 
XXII: “Points of order, including questions of relevancy, and appeals from 
the decision of the Presiding Officer, shall be decided without debate.”80 
As a secondary point of order and (in the reformers’ view) a point of order 
arising post-cloture, an immediate vote is guaranteed. 
On the other hand, the downside of this strategy is that it is an 
especially bold reinterpretation of the existing rule. While many words and 
phrases are subject to multiple meanings, Rule XXII’s phrase “three-fifths 
of the Senators duly chosen and sworn” is unambiguous and hard to 
reconcile with a simple majority threshold.
81
 We include this proposal, 
however, to highlight that this sort of action is possible. The 
reinterpretation is problematic not because it is “incorrect,” but because 
the reforming coalition would have to forthrightly acknowledge and 
defend an especially obvious power play.
82
  
5. Expand the Right to the Yeas and Nays 
Article 1, Section 5 of the Constitution states that “the Yeas and Nays 
of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one 
fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.”83 As currently interpreted 
by Senate practice, this constitutional right to a roll call vote is interpreted 
 
 
 80. SENATE RULE XXII, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, 
AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 112-1, at 
21 (2011), available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RulesOfSenateHome.  
 81. We note the possibility that reformers using this strategy may limit it to specific 
circumstances, leaving the general three-fifths requirement in place. 
 82. One could also argue that Rule XXII is unconstitutional because it violates an implicit 
constitutional default of majority rule. See AMAR, supra note 15, at 362 (making this argument); see 
also supra text accompanying note 78 (discussing this implicit constitutional rule). However, and as 
we noted earlier, given the availability of the conventional option to implement other strategies that 
would functionally accomplish the same thing, we do not address this argument in any detail. 
 83. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
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as conditional upon a vote actually occurring. Senators may request—and 
typically receive—a roll call vote on a bill or amendment, but if this 
request is granted debate continues unabated.
84
 These requests are 
understood as being about the form of a vote: if a vote on a proposition 
occurs, an order for the yeas and nays guarantees a roll call vote rather 
than a voice vote or a standing vote, but does not guarantee that this vote 
actually occurs.
85
  
While the current practice is understandable, an advocate for reform 
could argue that it subverts the clear meaning of this passage. If one-fifth 
of all the senators in the chamber ask for a vote on a pending amendment 
or measure, one could argue that they have a constitutional right to that 
vote actually occurring,
86
 while the current practice of the Senate denies 
senators their constitutional right to have their “Yeas and Nays” recorded 
in the journal.
87
  
This strategy is straightforward. A senator first brings up a measure or 
amendment, asks for the yeas and nays on that proposal, and then (perhaps 
after waiting a respectable time for debate to occur, or requesting a time 
for a vote by unanimous consent) makes a point of order that the 
constitutional guarantee of a vote has been nullified, with an immediate 
vote as the only remedy.  
This strategy has the rhetorical advantage of being based on a plausible 
constitutional argument and being relatively simple to implement. 
Substantively, it promises a major change in how the Senate functions 
because a minority of senators would suddenly be able to circumvent 
obstruction and obtain a vote on their proposals.
88
  
However, this reform may be impractical to use on a day-to-day basis. 
Unless the Senate wants to eliminate all debate between a call for the yeas 
and nays and the actual occurrence of the vote, it may be difficult to devise 
a non-arbitrary threshold for deciding how long discussion can continue 
 
 
 84. RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 47, at 774 (“The ordering of the yeas and nays on a question 
does not preclude or shut off further debate thereon before the vote is taken.”). 
 85. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-227, VOTING IN THE SENATE: FORMS AND 
REQUIREMENTS (2008). A voice vote occurs when the Presiding Officer says, “all in favor say ‘aye,’” 
then “all in favor say ‘nay,’” then the chair declares the winner based on which side seems to have the 
most members. A standing vote is the same, but senators stand to register their preferences when their 
position is called. Id. at 1. 
 86. The call for a yea and nay vote must be supported by one-fifth of those present, assuming a 
quorum is present. A majority of the Senate is required for a quorum, so a motion for a roll call vote 
may be supported by as few as ten senators. See RIDDICK & FRUMIN, supra note 47, at 1416. 
 87. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
 88. This would put a premium on the Senate Majority Leader to pre-screen bills and amendments 
coming to the Senate floor and only call up measures that he or she would like to see come to a formal 
vote. 
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before it begins to violate the constitutional right to a roll call vote. 
Furthermore, senators who oppose the reform may subsequently spend a 
lot of time devising new ways to force the Senate to take roll call votes. In 
practice, this approach would probably prove unworkable by itself but it 
would give a pro-reform Senate majority a tremendous bargaining chip it 
could use to negotiate for formal rule changes restricting obstruction. 
C. Comparison of Conventional Strategies 
This list of five strategies to reform the filibuster is not intended to be 
exhaustive. We have focused on reforms that are likely to significantly 
change the practice of filibustering. Thus, this list of strategies excludes 
other possible major reforms and omits a whole range of incremental 
reforms that could be imposed by precedent.  
Instead, the list is intended to demonstrate that there are a variety of 
options that are reasonably plausible. More subtly, the list demonstrates 
that we can compare and contrast strategies to select the approach that is 
easiest to implement and the most likely to have its desired effect. 
TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF REFORM OPTIONS 
 
Table 1 summarizes this discussion of the reforms based on the review 
of each proposal in Part I.B. It is not surprising that almost every strategy 
is intended to have a major effect, but the reforms vary across other 
dimensions. Based on our comparison, the option that has been tried the 
most often—renouncing the Senate’s tradition of acting as a continuous 
body—is the least effective and most costly strategy. On the other hand, 
we rate the strategy of revising the Senate's motion to suspend the rules as 
the most effective and least costly.  
 Magnitude of 
Change 
Practical Effect? Plausibility of 
Objection 
Simplicity of 
Implementation 
Repeal Standing Body 
Tradition 
  
(high uncertainty) 
  
Move the Previous 
Question 
    
Transform Motion to 
Suspend the Rules 
    
Rule XXII Cloture by 
Simple Majority  
 
    
Yeas & Nays 
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The critical point, however, is that each of these reforms is a viable 
option and that a simple majority of the Senate can pursue a precedent-
based strategy while working within the normal Senate procedures for rule 
interpretation.  
One may argue, however, that the criteria we posit are insufficient for 
assessing reform because they do not consider the appropriateness of 
using the conventional option we illustrate here. For example, some 
consider it “rude” to reform the filibuster “with 51 votes.”89 Moreover, a 
group of constitutional law scholars recently sent a letter to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee arguing in favor of the “constitutional option” to 
reform the filibuster on the first day of the new Congress.
90
 In the letter the 
professors note that “[t]he standing two-thirds requirement for altering the 
Senate’s rules” in the middle of a Congressional session “is a sensible 
effort at preventing changes to the rules in the midst of a game.”91 
Our concern is with the analogy of Senate politics to a “game” in 
which fair play—including rigid adherence to status quo rules—trumps 
any sense of purpose. The Constitution established the Senate to “promote 
the general Welfare” of the people, even it if means hurting the feelings of 
obstructionist senators.
92
 The rules of the Senate exist to steer the chamber 
toward decisions that fit this mandate; to the extent that the status quo 
rules detract from the public welfare, senators have a responsibility to alter 
their decision-making process. Moreover, filibustering itself is “rude.” In 
its various forms, filibustering is the exploitation of rights of deliberation 
to deny the majority of a legislature the right to make decisions on public 
policy issues. 
Most importantly, any argument against the appropriateness of the 
conventional option has to take into account the history of the option. If 
the conventional option has been used frequently in the past to limit 
filibustering, then it would be extraordinarily difficult to argue that the use 
of the conventional option now is an unacceptable break with tradition. As 
it turns out, the conventional option we describe has been used repeatedly 
 
 
 89. See Klein, supra note 12. In his post, Klein includes a link to support his claim that the 
Senate can change the rules “with 51 votes.” Id. Klein’s link is to a blog post with a lengthy discussion 
of how to change the Senate rules with fifty-one votes written by one of the authors. Id. (citing 
Jonathan Bernstein, A Very Wonky Post About Senate Rules, A PLAIN BLOG ABOUT POLITICS (Dec. 
15, 2010, 2:17 PM), http://plainblogaboutpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/12/very-wonky-post-about-
senate-rules.html). 
 90. See Letter by Bruce Ackerman, supra note 12. 
 91. Id. at 1. 
 92. See U.S. CONST., pmbl. 
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by both the House and the Senate to curb filibustering. We now discuss 
that history in the next Part. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FILIBUSTER REFORM IN CONGRESS 
The previous Part demonstrated that simple majorities of the Senate 
can achieve major reforms by using the conventional option. This Part 
explains how the conventional option has been critical to the development 
of procedural rules on filibustering in both the Senate and the House of 
Representatives. Along the way, we compare and contrast our historical 
account of Congressional filibustering with different accounts found in the 
political science and legal scholarship. Our perspective reflects recent 
research in political science
93
 that, as we discuss in more detail, corrects 
classic claims about filibustering and the Senate.  
This Part shows that filibustering is not an idiosyncrasy of the Senate. 
Filibustering, in fact, was once common in the House of Representatives. 
During the first century of Congressional history, there were roughly twice 
as many filibusters in the House as the Senate.
94
 We further show that the 
House achieved its current majoritarian structure by using the 
conventional option we describe in this Article. Accordingly, we argue 
that much can be learned about how legislators can restrict filibustering by 
closely examining how the members of the House reduced obstruction in 
their chamber.  
This Part also shows that filibustering has not always been pervasive in 
the Senate. The Senate, like the House, has limited filibustering in the past 
by using the conventional option. As we discuss below, the Senate has 
limited the filibuster before, and can do so again if a majority of senators 
so choose.   
 
 
 93. E.g., FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5; GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: 
OBSTRUCTION AND LAWMAKING IN THE U.S. SENATE (2006); KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A 
THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING (1998); BINDER & SMITH, supra note 57; Gregory J. Wawro & Eric 
Schickler, Legislative Obstructionism, 13 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 297 (2010); Gregory Koger, 
Filibustering and Majority Rule in the Senate: The Contest over Judicial Nominations, 2003–2005, in 
WHY NOT PARTIES?: PARTY EFFECTS IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE 159 (Nathan W. Monroe et al. 
eds., 2008); Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Changing Time Constraints on Congress: Historical Perspectives 
on the Use of Cloture, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 393 (3d ed., Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. 
Oppenheimer eds., 1985). 
 94. FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 37–96. 
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A. Reforming the Filibuster in the House 
Before we discuss the history of filibuster reform in the House, we 
begin by debunking a common myth about why filibustering in the Senate 
persists while it does not in the House. Several previous analyses of 
filibustering begin with the premise that filibustering in the Senate persists 
because a procedural motion known as the “previous question” was 
deleted from the rules of the Senate in 1806.  
In its simplest form, the argument is that:  
1. The previous question is intrinsically a simple majority motion 
to cut off debate; 
2. The rules of the House allow members to move the previous 
question; 
3. The rules of the Senate do not include a previous question 
motion, and have not since the motion was deleted from the rules 
in 1806; 
Ergo, the House is a majority rule chamber while the Senate is not.  
This premise, and the argument that flows from it, are both widely 
accepted in the existing literature. For example, Emmet J. Bondurant 
begins an essay on filibuster reform with this claim: 
Filibusters in the Senate are a profoundly undemocratic result of a 
mistake made in 1806 when the Senate accepted the advice of 
Aaron Burr and eliminated the “previous question” motion from its 
rules. Before that change, the previous question motion had been a 
“non-debatable motion that, if favored by the majority, close[d] 
debate and force[d] an immediate vote on a matter.”95  
Consequently, Bondurant concludes that “filibusters as a parliamentary 
tactic were unknown at the time the Constitution was adopted.”96 
For support, Bondurant quotes Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky, 
who offer a more nuanced discussion of the topic.
97
 According to Fisk and 
 
 
 95. Emmet J. Bondurant, The Senate Filibuster: The Politics of Obstruction, 48 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 467, 468 (2011) (footnote omitted). 
 96. Id. As noted earlier, the claim that filibusters were “unknown” to the authors of the 
Constitution or the early members of the Senate is incorrect. There were filibusters in the Continental 
Congress and state legislatures prior to the drafting of the Constitution. See supra text accompanying 
notes 22–23. 
 97. Bondurant, supra note 95, at 468 n.3 (citing Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The 
Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 188 (1997)). 
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Chemerinsky, “[i]t is unclear whether the previous question, in the form 
then practiced, served as a device to bring a measure to a vote, or whether 
it served to defer discussion of sensitive or embarrassing questions.”98 
Indeed, the version of the previous question motion adopted by the House 
in the First Congress stated that “[o]n a previous question no member shall 
speak more than once without leave.”99 Admittedly, this is a bit more 
restrictive than the general two-speech rule that applied to other 
questions.
100
 However, the text of the rule makes clear that, far from 
cutting off all debate and bringing a bill to an immediate vote, a previous 
question motion initiated a new (albeit limited) debate about whether to 
continue discussing the topic on the floor. And, if the previous question 
motion was approved, then debate on the main subject would continue 
unabated. 
This latter view—that the previous question motion of the First 
Congress initiated debate, not stopped it—is more consistent with the 
historical record. Robert Luce notes that in the early years of Congress, if 
a chamber voted against a previous question motion, then “it meant the 
main question was suppressed for the day.”101 This claim is confirmed in a 
monograph by Joseph Cooper, later printed as a Senate document, which 
explored the early use of the previous question motion in the Senate to 
determine if approving the motion had the effect of ending debate.
102
 
Moreover, Vice President Aaron Burr's rationale for eliminating the 
previous question motion in the Senate was that it was redundant with the 
motion for indefinite postponement.
103
 This rationale is further evidence 
that the previous question motion was used to put off delicate matters, not 
to end obstruction by prolonged speechmaking.  
1. Transforming the Previous Question Motion, February 1811 
If the initial rules of the House did not include a motion to limit debate, 
how did the House arrive at its current limits on debate? A first step along 
 
 
 98. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 97, at 188 (footnote omitted). 
 99. H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1789). 
 100. Id. 
 101. ROBERT LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE: PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES AND THE COURSE OF 
BUSINESS IN THE FRAMING OF STATUTES 270 (1922); see also DE ALVA STANWOOD ALEXANDER, 
HISTORY AND PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 180–81 (1916). 
 102. JOSEPH COOPER, THE PREVIOUS QUESTION: ITS STANDING AS A PRECEDENT FOR CLOTURE IN 
THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 87-104 (1962). 
 103. 1 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS 
DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848, at 365 (Charles Francis Adams ed. 1874). 
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this path was the transformation of the previous question motion during 
the tense period preceding the War of 1812.  
In the early morning hours of February 28, 1811, House members 
voted to change the interpretation of the previous question from a means 
of shelving delicate issues into a tool for cutting off debate.
104
 During a 
debate on American-English trade, a frustrated Republican majority 
moved and approved the previous question.
105
 Immediately afterwards, 
Thomas Gholson (R-VA), a member of the Republican majority, made a 
point of order that debate was not allowed after the previous question had 
been approved.
106
 When Barent Gardenier (Fed-NY), a particularly 
loquacious obstructionist, rose to speak on the point of order, another 
member, Peter Porter (R-NY), made a second point of order that debate is 
not allowed on challenges to the chair's rulings.
107
 All eight Federalists 
voted to allow debate on challenges, but Republicans voted 66–5 to 
prohibit it.
108
 Once debate on rulings from the chair had been stifled, the 
House swiftly approved Gholson’s point of order, which prohibited debate 
after the previous question motion had been approved.
109
 In two quick 
steps, the previous question motion was transformed from a means for 
continuing debate to a tool for ending it.
110
 
There are two important lessons in this episode. The first lesson is that 
the method used by the House majority above illustrates the general point 
of Part I: when a majority is faced by an obstructionist minority, using the 
conventional option of reinterpreting rules and setting new precedents can 
be more efficient and effective than attempting to formally change the 
rules. Specifically, this episode illustrates the right-side path in Figure 1, 
which shows a majority overturning an unfavorable decision by the chair 
by invoking a secondary point of order limiting debate on the first point of 
order.
111
  
The second lesson is that legislative majorities have extremely wide 
latitude when interpreting the rules of their own chamber. In 1811, the 
House converted the previous question—which previously had the effect 
 
 
 104. Most contemporary and subsequent accounts of the previous question consider the night of 
February 27–28, 1811, the decisive act that transformed the previous question motion. See 22 ANNALS 
OF CONG. 1091–93 (1811); ALEXANDER, supra note 101, at 185–88; 5 ASHER C. HINDS, PRECEDENTS 
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES § 5445 (1907). 
 105. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 1091–93. 
 106. Id. at 1091–92. 
 107. Id. at 1091–94. 
 108. Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. See supra Figure 1, at page 11. 
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of continuing the conversation if affirmed—into a motion to do the exact 
opposite. For senators seeking to emulate the House's actions on this late 
night in 1811, the lesson is not that the Senate reformers need a previous 
question motion. Instead, senators need any existing Senate rule or 
constitutional provision that can be converted into a means for limiting 
debate, and the conventional option gives them wide latitude to redefine 
the meaning of that rule. 
2. Filibustering in the House, 1811–1889 
Despite the reforms made on February 28, 1811, subsequent House 
majorities struggled to use the previous question motion to end debate. 
Initial rulings by Speaker Henry Clay held that approving the previous 
question motion led to a direct vote on the underlying bill.
112
 Amendments 
which had been approved in the Committee of the Whole or which were 
still pending when the previous question was called were dropped. This 
clumsiness, combined with general norms against suppressing 
deliberation, led to infrequent use of the motion in the years following the 
War of 1812.
113
  
Figure 2 illustrates the number of roll call votes on previous question 
motions from 1789 to 1889.
114
 Once House members began to use the 
motion more frequently after 1830, they made several changes to the 
previous question rule to make it more useful. The House adopted rules 
changes in 1840, 1848, 1860, 1880, and 1890 that improved the 
application of the previous question.
115
 In its 1890 form, the rule allowed a 
member to apply the previous question motion to a single motion, a series 
of motions, an amendment or amendments, or to carry a bill through to 
final passage.
116
 The numerous reforms to the previous question rule 
illustrate how an institutional change like the 1811 transformation may 
require subsequent reforms to be effective. These subsequent revisions add 
to the transaction costs for the initial reform.  
 
 
 112. HINDS, supra note 104, § 5446. 
 113. BINDER, supra note 62, at 89. 
 114. The information in Figure 2 is based on data contained in Inter-University Consortium for 
Pol. & Soc. Research & Cong. Quarterly, United States Congressional Roll Call Voting Records, 
1789–1996 (1998). 
 115. ALEXANDER, supra note 101, at 189–206. 
 116. Id. at 277–79. 
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FIGURE 2—ROLL CALL VOTES ON PREVIOUS QUESTION MOTIONS, 1789–1889 
 
Despite the use and improvement of the previous question motion, 
obstruction was common in the House throughout the nineteenth century. 
Why? The previous question motion was only effective as a limit on 
normal deliberation, such as speaking and offering amendments to a bill. 
But members of both the House and Senate used other filibustering tactics 
that were immune to the previous question motion. First, they could make 
and repeat motions that had priority over a vote on the previous question, 
such as a motion to adjourn, take a recess, or fix the day to which the 
House shall adjourn.
117
 For example, if one member moved the previous 
question and another member subsequently moved to adjourn, the first 
vote would be on the motion to adjourn. These dilatory motions could be 
alternated until either the minority or majority faction grew tired.  
 
 
 117. FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 17. 
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Second, previous question motions were also ineffective against a 
minority obstructing by refusing to vote en masse, a tactic called the 
“disappearing quorum.” Again, this tactic entailed members of a 
legislature refusing to participate in a vote so that the participation rate 
falls below the threshold for a quorum. In 2003 (Texas) and 2011 
(Wisconsin and Indiana), state legislators fled across state lines to avoid 
being forcibly returned to their legislatures to contribute to a quorum.
118
 In 
the House and Senate, there was a norm, despite rules to the contrary, that 
members were not compelled to vote, and if they did not vote they did not 
count toward a quorum. If some legislators were absent for innocuous 
reasons like illness or travel, a minority of the legislature could “break” a 
quorum by refusing to vote and thereby “disappearing.”119  
Incorporating these tactics into our definition of “filibustering” 
produces a surprising pattern. There was more obstruction in the 
nineteenth century House of Representatives than in the Senate. Figure 3 
depicts a summary of this pattern, showing during the nineteenth century 
both the general increase in obstruction over time in both chambers and 
the higher level of obstruction in the House.
120
  
 
 
 118. Karl Kurtz, Disappearing and Bolting Forums, THE NAT’L COUNCIL ON STATE 
LEGISLATORS: THE THICKET AT STATE LEGISLATURES BLOG (Feb. 21, 2012, 3:33 PM), 
http://ncsl.typepad.com/the_thicket/2012/02/disappearing-and-bolting-quorums.html. 
 119. FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 18. 
 120. Based on data collected, Koger identifies attempted disappearing quorums by scanning roll 
call records for votes on which most members of one party voted, most members of the opposing party 
did not vote, and the difference between the two proportions was statistically significant. A “dilatory 
motion” is one of a set of procedural motions that failed a roll call vote. A filibuster is defined as a bill 
or nomination opposed by a threshold level of obstruction. See id. at 42–53. 
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FIGURE 3—FILIBUSTERS IN THE U.S. HOUSE AND SENATE, 1801–1901 
 
 
Obstruction by non-voting was impervious to a previous question 
motion because, in the absence of a quorum, the House could not make 
any legislative decisions, including calling the previous question. As 
filibustering reached crisis levels between 1881 and 1889, there were 
fourteen successful disappearing quorums against previous question 
motions.
121
 During a subsequent showdown over House obstruction from 
1890 to 1894, there were forty-three more successful efforts to break a 
quorum.
122
 
Critically, the general ability of House and Senate members to 
filibuster included the power to obstruct changes to the rules of their 
respective chambers. In both chambers, legislators faced a situation similar 
to the modern Senate: any rules change, including proposed restrictions on 
filibustering, was itself subject to obstruction. In practice, as it turns out, 
this was a greater obstacle for rules changes in the nineteenth century 
House than the Senate. There were more filibusters against proposed rules 
 
 
 121. These statistics are based on an analysis of the data used to create Figure 3. 
 122. Id. 
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changes in the House than the Senate, including two rules changes that 
were blocked by obstruction in 1882 and 1889.
123
 In the latter case, the 
obstructionists actually blocked a previous question motion 
successfully.
124
 The main proponent of the 1889 rule change, Thomas 
Reed (R-ME), learned that he would have to try a different approach if he 
wanted to force through controversial changes in the House rules.
125
  
3. The Revolution in the House, 1889–1894 
At the beginning of the 51st Congress in 1889, the leaders of the 
Republican Party faced a challenge that may sound familiar. Filibustering 
had reached a crisis level. Both contemporary observers and historians 
consider the 50th Congress one of the most ineffective in history because 
one chamber of Congress was paralyzed by obstruction.
126
 The minority 
party considered itself entitled to veto the policy agenda of the party which 
had gained united control of Congress and the White House in the 
previous election. And any attempt to correct this dysfunction by 
amending the rules of the House was itself subject to obstruction and a 
minority party veto. 
When the 51st Congress began, the Republicans elected Thomas Reed 
as Speaker.
127
 Reed had been arguing for more centralized and efficient 
House rules for several years. Reed waited to act until the House began 
debating a contested election on January 29, 1890.
128
 Democrats refused to 
vote on the motion to consider this case, thereby breaking the quorum, but 
Reed directed the House Clerk to note that several Democrats were present 
but not voting so a quorum was present. After heated debate, this ruling 
was sustained 162-0 the next day, with zero Democrats voting. On January 
 
 
 123. FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 65–66. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See generally WILLIAM A. ROBINSON, THOMAS B. REED: PARLIAMENTARIAN (1930) 
(discussing history of 1889 rule change).  
 126. RICHARD V. REMINI, THE HOUSE: THE HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 243 
(2006). Since 1889 to 1894 is the pivotal period of House history, the events are recounted in 
numerous sources. For recent works, see BINDER & SMITH, supra note 57; FILIBUSTERING, supra note 
5; ERIC SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE U.S. CONGRESS (2001); and for classic works, see LUCE, supra note 101; ORLANDO OSCAR 
STEALEY, TWENTY YEARS IN THE PRESS GALLERY (1906). 
 127. Speakers of the House (1789 to present), U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history. 
house.gov/People/Office/Speakers/.  
 128. REMINI, supra note 126, at 248. At this point the House had not yet adopted any rules to 
govern the 51st Congress, so the House was using “general parliamentary law.” Since this term had 
little precise meaning, this tactic provided Reed with extra leeway in his parliamentary rulings. 
However, this was not necessary for Reed’s actions. Reed felt his rulings were entirely Constitutional, 
so his rulings would have been valid in either case. See id. at 250. 
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31, a second ruling (163–0, zero Democrats voting) affirmed the Speaker's 
right to ignore dilatory motions.
129
 Accordingly, in a span of only three 
days the Republicans had used the conventional option to suppress the two 
primary forms of filibustering in the Nineteenth Century House.  
Ten days after the second ruling, the House began debate on a new 
code of House rules, including rules codifying Speaker Reed's decisions. 
Having been deprived of their obstructionist techniques, the minority 
Democrats did not compel the Republicans to use the previous question to 
end debate on the Reed Rules. Instead, the majority and minority 
negotiated an agreement for consideration of the rules.
130
 The Republicans 
agreed to a resolution for considering the rules dictated by the Democrats. 
The resolution passed without any recorded disagreement.
131
 This accord 
automatically enforced the previous question after three days. But it is 
worth emphasizing that the previous question motion was not used to stifle 
obstruction against the adoption of chamber rules. Reed's precedents had 
already accomplished that feat.  
While this is the critical battle for purposes of this Article, we note that 
the war over filibustering continued for another four years. The Democrats 
regained control of the House in the 1890 elections and repudiated the 
anti-obstruction rules in 1891. By 1893, the Democrats had quietly 
devised their own response to dilatory motions. By 1894, the Democrats 
accepted limits on disappearing quorums after a prolonged Republican 
filibuster. The Republican minority lost their veto power but won their 
point. The House of Representatives could not govern the republic with a 
minority party empowered to veto everything.
132
 
As with the transformation of the previous question motion in 1811, the 
lesson from the House's efforts to suppress obstruction in the 1890s is that 
the critical step was a pair of decisive votes on rulings from the Presiding 
Officer. These rulings were achieved in much the same way as senators 
enforce or revise their rules because the members of the House could not 
and did not invoke an already-enforceable cloture rule.  
An even more important ingredient was determination. By the 1890s, 
the members and leaders of the majority party in the House of 
Representatives decided that their institution was at an impasse. They 
 
 
 129. FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 54–55. 
 130. 21 CONG. REC. 1206–08 (1890). 
 131. Id. 
 132. For a more extensive discussion of this phase, see SCHICKLER, supra note 126; 
FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 55–56. 
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faced a choice between governing and maintaining the traditions of the 
chamber, and they chose the former. 
B. Reforming the Filibuster in the Senate 
As with our discussion of the House, we do not intend to survey the 
entire history of filibustering and reform in the Senate in this section.
133
 
Instead, we merely seek to point out that senators had the power, through 
the conventional option, to adopt strong limits on filibustering throughout 
much of Senate history. If they had chosen to do so, their path to reform 
was no more difficult—and probably easier—than for their counterparts in 
the pre-Reed House. 
1. Limits on Senate Filibustering Before 1917 
The rules of the first Senate provided for the Presiding Officer to call 
senators to order for violating chamber rules and holding votes when the 
application of the rules to a case was uncertain. By 1828, the Senate rule 
clearly stated that every decision by the Presiding Officer was subject to 
an appeal to a vote by the Senate, in effect establishing the conventional 
option.
134
 This power could be used, and was used, to restrict filibustering.  
Senators reinterpreted rules to limit filibustering before the adoption of 
the first Senate cloture rule in 1917. Three prominent anti-obstruction 
precedents were:
135
 
 1879: the Presiding Officer counts all present senators, even 
nonvoting senators, toward a quorum.
136
 
 1897: the Presiding Officer mandates that a senator cannot 
request a quorum call immediately after a vote revealing the 
presence of a quorum.
137
 
 
 
 133. For well-researched accounts, see FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5; WAWRO & SCHICKLER, 
supra note 93; ZELIZER, supra note 54; BINDER & SMITH, supra note 57; BURDETTE, supra note 66; 
GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND PRACTICE (1938); 
CLARA HANNAH KERR, THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE (1895); 
Oppenheimer, supra note 93. 
 134. WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note 93, at 65–72. The authors go on to trace the development 
of a nondebatable motion to table appeals from rulings of the Presiding Officer. 
 135. For additional examples, see id. at 70; BINDER & SMITH, supra note 57, at 7. 
 136. BURDETTE, supra note 66, at 38–39. 
 137. Id. at 68. 
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 1908: the Presiding Officer counts nonvoting senators toward a 
quorum on a roll call vote. Upheld by roll call votes of thirty-
five to eight and thirty-five to thirteen.
138
 
These actions, and similar precedents set over the years, suffice to show 
that majorities could restrict obstruction by precedent if they chose to do 
so.  
But the historic Senate, like the current Senate, permitted filibustering 
by endless debate. In fact, some scholars point to a threatened filibuster 
against a proposed previous question rule in 1841 and an actual filibuster 
against an anti-obstruction rule proposal in 1891 as evidence that it was 
difficult to restrict obstruction in the Senate.
139
 In these two instances, it 
would have been easier to bring these anti-obstruction proposals to a vote 
if obstruction was already impossible, although it is not certain in either 
case that the propositions had enough votes to succeed.
140
 What these two 
incidents do not prove, however, is that it was impossible to restrict 
obstruction in the Senate, or more difficult to restrict obstruction in the 
Senate than the House. After all, these proposals were exposed to 
filibustering because their sponsors proposed them as formal rules 
changes. The reform advocates in both cases could have circumvented this 
quandary by using the conventional option to force votes on anti-
obstruction points of order instead. Senators also had the option of 
bringing up rules changes at the beginning of a new Congress while the 
floor agenda was usually uncrowded (1841 being a bit of an exception), 
which would make it easy for senators to wait out a filibuster. 
There is an alternative explanation for why the Senate did not follow 
the more drastic course set by the House in the 1890s. For the most part, 
Senate majorities were able to wait out filibusters, so it was rare for 
senators to pay the high costs of obstruction with little prospect of 
success.
141
 Narrow majorities were often able to win in this environment 
without strict rules to limit debate and, if necessary, could expedite the 
passage of controversial bills with new parliamentary precedents.
142
 
 
 
 138. Id. at 86–88. 
 139. BINDER, supra note 62, at 178–99. But see WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note 93, at 72–87. 
 140. As Wawro and Schickler point out, the coalitions supporting the underlying bills were, in 
both cases, internally divided. This is especially clear in the 1891 case, when the election enforcement 
bill (labeled the “Force Bill” by its detractors) and the rule proposal were eventually sidelined by 
motions to switch to other legislation. WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note 93, at 72–87. 
 141. FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 78–95. 
 142. See generally WAWRO & SCHICKLER, supra note 93 (discussing the procedures the 
Nineteenth Century Senate had for expediting passage of bills).  
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During this era, a majority cloture rule was a solution without a recurring 
problem. 
2. Cloture and Reform in the Senate, 1917–1949 
The “classic” Senate, in which filibustering was possible but rare and 
subject to the patience of the majority, lasted until the early twentieth 
century. During the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, Senate Republicans 
played the now-familiar role of a minority party obstructing the agenda of 
a newly elected Democratic President taking power after a period of 
divided government. In some cases, defecting Senate Democrats 
welcomed the cover provided by Republican obstruction. Wilson, 
however, came to despise the filibuster. The 1916 Democratic Party 
platform—drafted by Wilson—included an endorsement of a Senate rule 
limiting filibustering.
143
  
The Senate's first “cloture” rule would come soon after the 1916 
election. After “a little band of willful men,” as Wilson called them, 
blocked a bill concerning merchant shipping in the final days of the 66th 
Congress, Wilson called the chamber back into session to adopt its first 
cloture rule.
144
 Senators, however, fearing the concentration of power that 
would result from the combination of a majority cloture rule, party 
caucuses that could dictate the floor votes of party members, and a 
President making aggressive use of patronage and the bully pulpit, only 
adopted a rule providing for closure by a two-thirds vote.
145
 This rule 
essentially codified the status quo, since it took a third of the chamber or 
more to sustain a filibuster.
146
 Over the next eight years, senators rejected 
simple majority cloture on three different occasions.
147
 At the same time, 
senators allowed the rule to be undermined by new cloture-proof tactics 
 
 
 143. Koger, supra note 72; see also Kathleen Bawn & Gregory Koger, Effort, Intensity and 
Position Taking: Reconsidering Obstruction in the Pre-Cloture Senate, 20 J. THEORETICAL POL. 67 
(2008); THOMAS W. RYLEY, A LITTLE GROUP OF WILLFUL MEN: A STUDY OF CONGRESSIONAL 
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY (1975); Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 217–26. 
 144. Koger, supra note 72, at 220. 
 145. Gold and Gupta credit the adoption of the 1917 cloture rule to the threat of a “constitutional 
option” expressed during floor debate over the closed rule. Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 217–26. 
This is inconsistent with the near-universal account of the 1917 rule, which attributes the timing of this 
rule to the firestorm of public opinion excited by Woodrow Wilson. In order for a threatened 
constitutional option to lead to bargaining and concessions, the opponents of reform must consider the 
threat credible. There is little evidence to suggest that the senators proposing a constitutional option 
had the votes to carry through. See Koger, supra note 72, at 209–20. 
 146. Koger, supra note 72, at 221. 
 147. Gregory Koger, Cloture Reform & Party Government in the Senate, 1918–25, 68 J. POL. 708 
(2006). 
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like filibustering during the opening of the Senate and filing hundreds of 
amendments to a bill before cloture is invoked.
148
 
During the 1920s, senators did embrace a different kind of reform: 
changing the congressional schedule so there is no longer a filibuster-
prone “short” session that continues until the March following an 
election.
149
 Senators were more likely to filibuster during short sessions 
because their end date was known in advance. This meant that everyone 
knew how long the filibuster had to last to succeed, how much other 
legislation was pending and, finally, how much potential collateral damage 
would be caused by a filibuster. This reform was finally adopted as the 
20th Amendment to the Constitution in 1933.
150
  
3. The Long Debate on Cloture Reform, 1949–1975 
In 1949, after a decade of relative stability, senators renewed their 
debate over filibustering and reform. This conversation would last for 
three decades and culminate in four major revisions of the cloture rule. 
The net result of these revisions was a shift in the threshold for cloture 
from two-thirds of all voting senators to three-fifths of the entire Senate, 
and a rule that was a little more foolproof. In the beginning, the cloture 
reform effort was closely tied to the politics of the civil rights movement, 
with supporters of civil rights legislation seeking a more restrictive cloture 
rule and opponents opposing cloture reform.
151
 The reform effort persisted 
after the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 
1965, however, supported by a coalition of left-leaning interest groups and 
senators.
152
 
Much of the effort to change the cloture rule could have been avoided 
if senators had simply used the conventional option to reinterpret the 
cloture rule in 1949. In March 1949, reformers set out to close the 
loopholes in the 1917 cloture rule, particularly the interpretation that held 
that the rule only applied to bills once they were on the floor of the Senate, 
but not to motions to bring those bills to the floor.
153
 On March 11, 1949, 
the Senate held a vote on this interpretation of the rule, with Vice 
President Alben Barkley ruling from the chair that the cloture rule also 
 
 
 148. FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 156–57. 
 149. Id. at 41–42. 
 150. Id. at 109–11. 
 151. ZELIZER, supra note 54, at 14–61. 
 152. Id. at 61–173.  
 153. BINDER & SMITH, supra note 57, at 173–75. 
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applied to motions.
154
 However, senators overturned this ruling by a vote 
of forty-six to forty-one.
155
 After this defeat the reformers agreed to a 
compromise rule, but, since they had lost this critical vote, they had little 
leverage.
156
 The 1949 rule allowed cloture on any “measure, motion, or 
issue” by two-thirds of the entire Senate, except no cloture was possible on 
resolutions to change Senate rules.
157
  
The reformers' reliance on the constitutional option, rather than the 
conventional option, began in earnest as a response to the 1949 rule, which 
seemingly allowed no mechanism for contested rules changes. Efforts in 
1953 and 1957 failed, but by 1959 Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D-
TX) was nervous enough about the danger of a majoritarian coup that he 
proposed a new compromise rule which lowered the cloture threshold to 
two-thirds of all senators voting and re-applied the cloture rule to proposed 
revisions to Senate rules.
158
  
Neither the 1959 rule nor the passage of major civil rights legislation 
quelled the movement for further cloture reform. Reform efforts came up 
for a vote in 1961, 1963, 1967, 1969, and 1971.
159
 But in each case the 
reformers lost test votes or votes on key parliamentary rulings.
160
 
4. The Modern Senate Filibuster, 1975–Present  
In 1975, however, the reformers had a clear opportunity for success. 
The Democratic majority's ranks swelled to sixty members, and Vice 
President Rockefeller, a Republican, strongly supported cloture reform.
161
 
For the first time, reformers won a test vote on whether the Senate is a 
standing body, fifty-one to forty-two.
162
 In the ensuing debate, reformers 
showed little interest in squelching last-gasp filibustering by James Allen 
(D-AL) and, after negotiations with the leaders of both parties, the 
reformers settled for the current cloture thresholds: (1) three-fifths of the 
 
 
 154. Id. at 173. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Gregory Koger, Getting Closure: Majority Rule and Cloture Reform in the Senate, 1949–75 
(2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 157. Id. The reformers might have been better off if they had not agreed to this deal. The vote was 
close and they could have re-challenged the interpretation of the rule as soon as they gained a little 
more support. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. 94 CONG. REC. 3854 (1975). 
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entire Senate to invoke cloture on most measures, and (2) two-thirds of 
those voting for rules changes.
163
  
The 1975 episode illustrates the drawbacks of the constitutional option. 
It was extremely difficult to build a majority for the constitutional option 
even though, as Sarah Binder and Steve Smith stress, there were multiple 
instances between 1959 and 1975 when a simple majority voted to support 
reform.
164
 Moreover, when the reformers finally won their critical vote in 
1975, this victory did not directly impose any real limits on filibustering, 
nor lay out a clear path to voting on rules changes.  
The 1975 rule ended the biennial efforts to lower the cloture threshold 
for the next twenty years, but it also began a period of tightening and 
clarifying the rule. In 1976 the rule was amended to clarify the process for 
filing amendments before cloture is invoked.
165
 In a June 1976 precedent, 
the Senate voted that a motion to indefinitely postpone an amendment 
after cloture was invoked was dilatory. In early 1977, an attempt by then-
Majority Leader Robert Byrd to limit post-cloture filibusters by forcing 
votes on dozens of amendments was blocked by the threat of a 
filibuster.
166
 However, in October 1977, Byrd, working with Vice 
President Walter Mondale, successfully cracked down on this tactic by 
ruling the gratuitous amendments dilatory and out of order.
167
 This was a 
clear illustration that senators can limit obstruction using the conventional 
option without revoking the Senate's standing body status.
168
  
More reforms would come under Byrd's leadership. In 1979, the Senate 
revised the cloture rule to prevent filibusters-by-amendment after cloture 
had been invoked.
169
 The Republican majority agreed to this revision in 
exchange for Byrd dropping his threat to push through a broader package 
of reforms by majority vote.
170
 Subsequently, Byrd also streamlined the 
 
 
 163. Id. For a detailed account of the 1975 contest, see MARTIN GOLD, SENATE PROCEDURE & 
PRACTICE 60–68 (2d ed. 2008). 
 164. BINDER & SMITH, supra note 57, at 161–85. 
 165. S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., 112TH CONG., SENATE CLOTURE RULE 209–10 (Comm. 
Print 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT66046/pdf/CPRT-112SPRT66046.pdf 
(prepared by the Congressional Research Service and the Library of Congress). 
 166. Senate Filibuster Rule, 1977, in CONGRESS AND THE NATION, 1977–1980, VOL. V: THE 95TH 
AND 96TH CONGRESSES (5th ed. 1981). 
 167. The Nation: Night of the Long Winds, TIME, Oct. 10, 1977, available at http://www.time. 
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,915562,00.html.  
 168. Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 263. 
 169. Senate Filibuster Rule, 1979 Legislative Chronology, in CONGRESS AND THE NATION, supra 
note 166, at 915–19. The rule limited total post-cloture debate to 100 hours and prevented any senator 
from calling up more than two amendments until every senator had an opportunity to call up 
amendments. 
 170. FILIBUSTERING, supra note 5, at 178. 
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nomination process by combining the motion to switch from legislative to 
executive business (treaties and nominations) and to take up a specific 
nomination.
171
 This reform was accomplished by a vote on a parliamentary 
ruling in March 1980—not a rule change, and not at the beginning of a 
new Congress. In other words, this reform was implemented through the 
conventional option, with no lasting adverse consequences. 
After three decades of debate over the cloture rule change and six years 
of revision and extension, the Senate stabilized from 1981 to the present. 
In 1986, senators agreed to reduce post-cloture debate time from 100 
hours to thirty hours, but otherwise left the rule intact.
172
 In 1995, a 
proposal by Tom Harkin (D-IA) and Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), which 
lowered the cloture threshold by three votes after each failed cloture vote 
until it reached fifty-one senators, failed by a large seventy-six to nineteen 
margin, after which there was little mention of cloture reform for several 
years.
173
 From 2003 to 2005, the Senate engaged in a well-known 
argument over judicial nominations that ended in May 2005 with a bargain 
between a bipartisan group of senators dubbed the “Gang of 14,” many of 
whom were ideologically moderate.
174
 The resulting bargain did not result 
in any rule changes but defused the crisis with informal guarantees of fair 
behavior. As in previous disputes, the key to this deal was the threat of 
manipulation of chamber rules by simple majority vote in the middle of a 
session.  
Obviously, the debate over filibuster reform continues. In January 
2011, frustrated Democratic senators proposed reforms that would revive 
attrition-style filibusters by forcing filibustering senators to actually hold 
the floor of the Senate.
175
 These proposals failed forty-four to fifty-one and 
forty-six to forty-nine, with all votes in favor coming from Democratic 
senators; these votes suggested near-universal support within the majority 
party.
176
 These margins are somewhat deceptive, however, since these 
proposals required a two-thirds majority for passage in accordance with an 
agreement struck between Democratic and Republican leaders. As part of 
 
 
 171. Gold & Gupta, supra note 11, at 265–67. 
 172. Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Senate through the Looking Glass: The Debate Over Television, 
14 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 313 (1989). 
 173. On this 1995 effort, see BINDER AND SMITH, supra note 53, at 182–84. 
 174. Koger, supra note 93, at 167–74. See also Sarah A. Binder et al., Going Nuclear, Senate 
Style, 5 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 729, 736 (2007). 
 175. This effort was preceded by a series of hearings by the Senate Rules Committee. See, e.g., 
157 CONG. REC. S33 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2011) (statement of Sen. Tom Udall (D-NM)). 
 176. U.S. SENATE ROLL CALL VOTES, 112TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (2011), http://www.senate.gov/ 
legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/vote_menu_112_1.htm. Bernie Sanders of Vermont, formally an 
independent but aligned with the Democratic party, supported both measures. Id.  
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this deal the Senate also enacted standing orders to publicize individual 
threats to filibuster, known as holds, and to waive the reading of 
amendments. The reforms were limited because the Democrats lacked the 
votes to force their reforms through and hence the bargaining leverage to 
extort major concessions from the minority party.
177
  
Democratic frustration clearly increased. On October 6, 2011, Reid led 
an effort to prohibit motions to suspend the rules and allow nongermane 
amendments after cloture has been invoked. Notably, Reid and a near-
unanimous Democratic majority (Democrats fifty-one to one; Republicans 
zero to forty-seven) made this reform by overturning both a ruling from 
the Presiding Officer and the advice of the Senate Parliamentarian based 
on earlier precedents.
178
 While this reform was relatively modest by itself, 
the willingness of the Democrats to use this method suggested that they 
were frustrated enough to use parliamentary precedents to reshape Senate 
process. In May 2012, Reid expressed this frustration, stating, “If there 
were anything that ever needed changing in this body, it's the filibuster 
rules, because it's been abused, abused, abused.”179  
In January 2013, Reid negotiated a second set of reforms with minority 
leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY). This reform package included two rules 
changes: (1) it streamlined the steps to initiate a conference committee to 
resolve differences with the House on a bill to a single cloture vote and 
two hours of debate, and (2) established an expedited process for cloture 
petitions on agenda-setting “motions to proceed”, provided the cloture 
petition is supported by the leaders and at least seven other members of 
each party. Additionally, two “trial reforms” were adopted for the duration 
of the 113th Congress: (1) shortened post-cloture debate for low-level 
executive positions and district court judges, and (2) simple-majority 
cloture for motions to proceed provided that each party is allowed to offer 
two amendments of its choice.
180
  
The January 2013 agreement included a pledge of good behavior (that 
is, no unreasonable obstruction) by the Republicans and a commitment 
 
 
 177. Alexander Bolton, Reid Must Wrestle with Undecided Dems to Reform Filibuster Rules, THE 
HILL (Nov. 30, 2012, 2:42 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/270237--reid-must-wrestle-with-
nine-undecided-democrats-to-reform-filibuster-rules. 
 178. Ryan Grim & Michael McAuliff, Harry Reid Busts Up Senate Precedent, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Dec. 6, 2011, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/06/harry-reid-senate-precedent_n_ 
999291.html (updated version). 
 179. Manu Raju, Frustrated Harry Reid: Reform the Filibuster, POLITICO (May 10, 2012, 6:32 
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0512/76189.html. 
 180. Ryan Grim, et al., Harry Reid, Mitch McConnell Reach Filibuster Reform Deal, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2013, 11:43 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/24/harry-reid-
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from Reid that he would not pursue any conventional option maneuvers 
during the 113th Congress. Neither promise lasted six months. By mid-
July, Reid threatened to impose simple majority cloture on executive 
branch nominations in order to push through candidates for Secretary of 
Labor, the directors of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and 
Environmental Protection Agency, and three slots on the National Labor 
Relations Board.
181
 In the hours before the Senate held its showdown votes 
on a conventional option, Reid struck a deal with some Republican 
members to approve the held-up nominations, except that two of the three 
NLRB nominees were swapped for other candidates.
182
 
This uneasy peace lasted until November 2013. The Democrats were 
frustrated by Republican obstruction of three nominations to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the nomination 
of Representative Melvin Watt (D-NC) to head the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency, and once again threatened to reinterpret Rule 22 so a 
simple majority is sufficient to limit debate on nominations. Unlike 
previous iterations of this game, however, senators did not defuse the 
crisis with a last-minute bipartisan deal. On November 21 senators voted 
fifty-two to forty-eight (with three Democratic “nay” votes) to 
“reinterpret” the three-fifths clause of Senate Rule 22 to mean “simple 
majority” for all executive nominations and all district and appellate court 
positions.
183
 Note that Reid’s proposed reinterpretation excludes Supreme 
Court nominations without any clear basis for this distinction. The 
precedent could easily be extended to Supreme Court nominations if the 
situation arises. The precedent also retains the three-fifths cloture 
threshold for ordinary legislation.  
Filibustering persists in the Senate because no majority of the Senate 
has ever taken the necessary steps to abolish the practice. The Senate 
filibuster will be reformed if and when a majority of the chamber decides 
that they lose more than they gain by tolerating the existing practice. 
Should that day come, the pro-reform majority will not lack for procedural 
strategies to limit filibustering.  
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CONCLUSION 
As noted in the Introduction, Senator Reid has recently used the 
“nuclear option” to abolish the filibuster for judicial nominees.184 But by 
using such terms as “nuclear option,” reformers imply that the chief 
obstacle to reform is the set of current Senate rules and procedures. As 
shown in this Article, there is nothing stopping a majority of senators from 
enacting further reforms during this current Congressional term or at any 
point during a subsequent session. In fact, and as evidenced by the 
conventional option, the existing Senate rules and procedures demonstrate 
that a majority of senators can enact any reform it desires at any time—
that the Senate is ultimately a majoritarian institution. Accordingly, the 
debate over reform should not “shroud the issue in layer upon layer of 
procedural complexity,” but focus on the merits of any proposed reform 
and the reasons why senators prefer the status quo or reform.
185
  
 
 
 184. Kane, supra note 4. 
 185. AMAR, supra note 15, at 366. 
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